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Smartphones, Fingerprints, and Search Warrants
.Fabiola De Armas
This past decade alone, the smartphone evolved from a device solely used
to make phone calls to a device that stores all aspects of life in addition to
making phone calls. With advanced smart phones, individuals can store sensi-
tive material, pictures, and personal information. Currently, in the criminal
system, smartphones pose two fundamental issues: (1) whether smartphones
can be seized during a search with a valid warrant; and (2) whether individuals
can be compelled to provide their fingerprints to unlock their smartphones
during a valid search without violating Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights to
be free from unreasonable searches and seizures and self-incrimination.'
Courts have held that constitutional protections extend to smartphones,
and violations of those protections can affect anyone who owns one.2 In Sep-
tember 2017, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and the Electronic
Frontier Foundation filed a suit in Boston's federal court on behalf of eleven
travelers whose electronic devices were searched without a warrant.3 The plain-
tiffs argued that searching personal electronic devices without a warrant based
on probable cause violated "the constitutional rights of individuals to keep the
private and expressive details of their lives free from unwarranted government
scrutiny."
4
Without a bright-line rule from the U.S. Supreme Court, federal courts
face difficulties ruling on these issues. To address these two issues, federal
courts must determine whether probable cause exists, whether fingerprints can
be used to unlock coded cellphones, and whether a search has exceeded the
scope of the warrant.5
1 U.S. CONST. amend. IV-V.
2 Riley v. California, 134 U.S. 2473, 2489 (2014) (finding cellphones store data subject to
privacy protections).
3 Debra Cassens Weiss, ACLU suit challenges warrantless searches of electronic devices at bor-
der, ABA JoURNAL (Sept. 13, 2017), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/aclu suit-challen
gesLwarrantless searches of electronic devices at border.
4 Id.
5 See People v. McCarty, 223 Ill. 2d 109, 149 (2006); In reApplication for a Search Warrant,
236 F. Supp. 3d 1066, 1069 (N.D. Ill. 2017); United States v. Winn, 79 F. Supp. 3d 904, 914
(2015).
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PROBABLE CAUSE
A valid search warrant requires probable cause- "facts and circumstances
known to the arresting officer at the time of the arrest would lead a reasonable
person to believe that a crime had occurred and the suspect had committed
it."6 A valid search warrant must provide specific details of the location, iden-
tification, and nature the evidence expected to be recovered. 7 Generally, "a
search warrant's description is sufficient if it enables the officer executing the
warrant, with reasonable effort, to identify the place to be searched."8 Valid
warrants for electronic devices demand "specific facts as to who is involved in
the criminal conduct linked to the subject premises, or specific facts as to what
particular Apple-branded encrypted device is being employed (if any)" and
specific details stating "what will be found at the subject premises and what the
government expects to find at subject premises."
FORCED FINGERPRINTING
Uncertainty exists with forced fingerprinting because unlocking a
smartphone can constitute testimonial evidence.' 0 Generally, the Constitution
protects oral testimonial evidence but not fingerprints. 1 No rule addresses
"forced fingerprinting" of individuals present during the search, including re-
sidents or visitors.12 According to Magistrate Judge Mary M. Rowland of the
US District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, the current rule states:
if during a search, the smartphone's ownership is known, then the forced fin-
gerprint to unlock the cellphone does not constitute testimonial. 13 However, if
the smartphone's owner is not known, then the opposite results. 4
For example, in Application for a Search Warrant, the warrant authorized
the search and seizure and used specific language: "various items presumed to
be located at a particularly identified location" and "various items including
6 People v. McCarty, supra note 6; People v. Edgar, 2014 IL App (1st) 141703, 1 110.
7 People v. McCarty, supra note 6.
8 Id.
9 In re Application for a Search Warrant, supra note 6.
10 Hiibelv. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 177, 188 (2004) (fingerprinting can establish
a suspect's connection with the crime).
11 In re Application for a Search Warrant, supra note 6.
12 In re Application for a Search Warrant, supra note 6; Phone Interview with Mary Rowland,
Magistrate Judge, U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, in Chicago, IL (Nov.
2, 2017).
13 Interview with Mary Rowland, supra note 13.
14 Id.
15
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various forms of electronic storage media and computer equipment." 15 The
government sought the authority to "compel any individual who is present at
the subject premises at the time of the search to provide his fingerprints and/or
thumbprints 'onto the Touch ID sensor of any Apple iPhone, iPad, or other
Apple brand device in order to gain access to the contents of any such de-
vice.' "16 However, the Court found, the language of the latter part of the
warrant was too broad and over-inclusive because it intended to authorize the
search and seizure of any "persons at the Subject Premises" to apply their fin-
gerprints to any Apple electronic device recovered at the premises.17 In this
case, forced fingerprinting violated Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights.18 The
smartphone's owner was not known, and compelling the individuals present
during the search to "apply their fingerprints to any Apple electronic device
recovered at the premises" constituted testimonial evidence and violated con-
stitutional protections.
WHETHER THE SEARCH EXCEEDED THE SCOPE
OF THE WARRANT
The language of the warrant establishes the scope of the allowable search.2"
However, searching the contents of a smartphone generally requires an addi-
tional search warrant.2 1 When information is uncovered on smartphones in the
absence of additional search warrants, courts uphold individuals' constitutional
rights against potentially incriminating information.2 2 The additional search
warrant remedies this issue by requiring police officers to specify details of the
smartphone's content, and the information they intend to recover.2
The U.S. Supreme Court recognizes that cellphones have a "particularly
powerful possessory interest" and an additional search warrant addresses these
privacy issues. 24 For example, in Riley v. California, the Court found that "a
cell phone is not immune from a search but that a warrant is generally required
15 In re Application for a Search Warrant, supra note 6 at 1066.
16 Id. at 1067.
17 Id. at 1068; Interview with Mary Rowland, supra note 13.
18 In re Application for a Search Warrant, supra note 6 at 1068.
19 Id.
20 McCarty, 223 Ill. 2d.
21 Interview with Mary Rowland, supra note 13.
22 In re Application for a Search Warrant, supra note 6 at 1074.
23 Id.
24 United States v. Winn, supra note 6.
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before such a search, even when a cell phone is seized incident to arrest. ' '2 5 The
state court litigation follows this ruling. In People v. Davis, the Illinois Appel-
late Court declined to extend "the search-incident-to arrest exception" to in-
clude searches of the data on a cellphone and held that "a warrant is generally
required before such a search, even when a cell phone is seized incident to
arrest."'26 The following year, in People v. Butler, the Illinois Appellate Court
acknowledged "a search of a cellphone contains an immense amount of digital
information pertaining to a person's 'privacies of life' and that as a result, cell
phones implicate privacy concerns far beyond those implicated in searches of
objects such as purses or wallets. "27
The additional search warrant requirement for smartphones ensures that
individuals are afforded a supplemental layer of protection by mandating that
the language of the warrant address specific details of the location, identifica-
tion, and nature of the information expected to be recovered.2 8 In United States
v. Winn, the Defendant was charged a misdemeanor of public indecency be-
cause he allegedly took inappropriate pictures of young children at the public
pool and was fondling over his swimsuit.29 The warrant authorized the officer
to search "any or all files contained on said cellphone" which included photos,
messages, and deleted items. 30 The warrant provided sufficient details specify-
ing the scope of the search-the location and nature of the information the
officer expected to be recovered. 3' While the Court found that the officer had
probable cause to seize the Defendant's cellphone, the officer abused his discre-
tion by exceeding the scope of the search, and the evidence was suppressed.3 2
The Court reasoned that the officer did not have probable cause to "rummage
through every conceivable bit of data, regardless of whether it bore any rele-
vance to the criminal activity." 33 Thus, the Court found that the officer acted
in good faith in applying for the search, but overstepped the scope of the
25 Riley v. California, supra note 2 at 2493.
26 People v. Davis, 2014 IL App (4th) 121040, 23.
27 People v. Butler, 2015 IL App (1st) 131870, 39.
28 Interview with Mary Rowland, supra note 13.
29 United States v. Winn, supra note 6 at 909, 911-12.
30 Id. at 911 (searching phone's "SIM Card or SD Card to include but not limited to the
calendar, phonebook, contacts, SMS messages, MMS messages, emails, pictures, videos, images,
ringtones, audio files, all call logs, installed application data, GPS information, WIFI informa-
tion, internet history and usage, any system files on phone, SIM Card, or SD Card, or any data
contained in the cellphone, SIM Card or SD Card to include deleted space").
3' Id.
32 Id. at 927.
33 Id. at 922.
17
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search, and the evidence recovered violated the Defendant's Fourth Amend-
ment rights.
34
CONCLUSION
Smartphones, in addition to making phone calls, act as mini-computers
and can store personal and sensitive information. In the wake of emerging
technologies and fingerprint recognition features to unlock smartphones, two
main questions arise regarding constitutional protections and search warrants:
(1) whether smartphones can be seized during a search with a valid warrant;
and (2) whether individuals can be compelled to provide their fingerprint to
unlock their smartphone during a valid search without violating Fourth and
Fifth Amendment rights to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures and
self-incrimination. 3 5 Since a bright-line rule does not exist, answering these
questions requires an analysis of whether probable cause exists, whether finger-
prints can be used to unlock coded cellphones, and whether a search has ex-
ceeded the scope of the warrant.
36
Smartphones can be seized during a search pursuant to a search warrant if
probable cause exists and the seizure falls within the scope of the search war-
rant. 37 Additionally, individuals can be compelled to provide their fingerprints
to unlock their smartphones during a valid search without violating constitu-
tional rights. 38 However, the person conducting the search must have an addi-
tional search warrant detailing the specific content of the phone and the
information expected to be recovered.39 Then, the person conducting the
search must determine whether the forced fingerprint constitutes testimonial
evidence.4" If the smartphone's owner is known, then the forced fingerprint
does not constitute testimonial evidence.4 1 However, if the smartphone's
owner is not known, and the forced fingerprint is used to identify the owner,
then the forced fingerprint constitutes testimonial evidence and violates consti-
tutional rights.
42
34 Id. at 926-27.
35 U.S. CONST. amend. IV-V.
36 See People v. McCarty, supra note 6; In re Application for a Search Warrant, supra note 6;
United States v. Winn, supra note 6.
37 People v. McCarty, supra note 6.
38 Interview with Mary Rowland, supra note 13.
39 In re Application for a Search Warrant, supra note 6 at 1074.
40 Id.
41 Id.
42 Id.
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The answers to these questions are highly fact and circumstance-specific.
As smartphone technology continues to evolve to include features such as face
and voice recognition, it is likely that courts will be faced with even more
questions concerning constitutional rights and search warrants. 4 3 Because no
bright-line rules exist for these rapidly evolving technologies, courts must con-
tinue to adapt and expand on these concepts that shape the nature of Fourth
and Fifth Amendment rights and search warrants.
43 Id.
19
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